Parker, Henry

A POLITICAL CATECHISM,

OR,

Certain Queſtions concerning the Government of this Land, Anſwered in his Majeſties own words, taken out of His Anſwer to the 19 Propoſitions, *Pag.* 17, 18, 19, 20. of the firſt Edition; with ſome brief Obſervations thereupon.

Publiſhed for the more compleat ſetling of Conſciences; particularly of thoſe that have made the late Proteſtation, to maintain the Power and Priviledges of Parliament, when they ſhall herein ſee the Kings owne Interpretation what that Power and Priviledges are.

We can do nothing againſt the Truth, but for the Truth. 2 Cor. 13. 8.

It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. *Ordered by the Committee of the Houſe of Commons in Parliament concerning Printing, that this Booke entituled,* A Politicall Catechiſm, *be printed.*

IOHN WHITE.

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A Politicall Catechiſm,

Serving to inſtruct thoſe that have made the Proteſtation concerning the power and priviledges of Parliament; taken out of his Majeſties Anſwer to the 19 Propoſitions.

Queſtion.

HOW *many Simple kinds are there of Civill Government of States, and Common-wealths?*

Anſwer. **There are three kinds of Government among men; Abſolute Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy,** *page*, 17.

Qu. 2. *Are there any of theſe Simple Formes perfect?*

Anſ. **All theſe have their particular Conveniences and Inconveniences,** *page* 17.

Obſerv. 1 Experience hath taught men everywhere to acknowledge this, and accordingly there never was long (if at all) continued any of theſe Formes exactly Simple; though ſome have more ſeemed ſuch then others. Alſo in all mixtures there is commonly ſome one of theſe Forms more conſpicuous then the reſt, from whence ſuch a particular Government hath its denomination.

Q. 3. *Is the State of* England *governed by any one of theſe kinds ſimply?*

A. **The Experience and Wiſdom of your Anceſtors hath moulded this [Government] out of a mixture of theſe.** *page* 18,

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Qu. 4

History 14 Jez1 Harding 8s 6d 18 Ja 23 A.T.

Q. 4 *What kind of government then is that of the state of* England?
A. Regulated Monarchy. *page* 18.

Observ. 1. If this Government be a mixture of all these, and a Regulated Monarchy; then it is a fond thing with us to talk of an Absolute Monarchy, and what an Absolute Monarch is, or may doe. And it is only the language of Flattery that holds such Discourses.

2 It need not be counted a Solecisme (as some would perswade us) to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy, such a Monarchy as ours is.

3 If this Government be a mixture of all three, then the House of Commons, the Representative Body of the People, must needs be allowed a share in Government (some at least) which yet is denyed, *page* 19.

4 If this Government be a mixture, then is not the Government according to these Lawes, Solely Trusted to the King, as seems to be affirmed *page* 18.

5 If the Government be Regulated, why do men tell us that the King is above all Law? for it is by Lawes that he is Regulated.

6 If the King bee Regulated by the Law, then is the King Accountable to the Law, and not to God only, as men would make us beleeve.

7 If the Monarchy or Regall Authority it selfe bee Regulated, then whatsoever is done by the King, undeniably without and beyond the limits of that Regulation, is not *Regall Authority*. And therefore

8 To resist the Notorious Transgressions of that Regulation, is no Resisting of *Regall Authority*. And

9 It is so farre from being a Resisting of the Ordinance of God, that it is not so much as Resisting the Ordinance of man.

Q. 5. *By whom was this government framed in this sort? or who is to be accounted the Immediate Efficient of the Constitution thereof?*
A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this, *page* 18.

Observ. 1. If our Ancestors were the moulders of this Govern-

ment.

ment, then the King hath not his power, Solely, or Immediately, by Divine Right.

2. Much leſſe hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conqueſt.

3 But the Immediate Originall of it was from the People. And if ſo, Then——

4 In queſtioned caſes, the King is to Produce his Grant (for he hath no more then what was granted) and not the People to ſhew a Reſervation; For all is preſumed to be Reſerved, which cannot be proved to be granted away.

Q. 6 *Is this Regulated and mixt Monarchy, as good as an Abſolute Monarchy, or better, or worſe?*

A. This Excellent Conſtitution of this Kingdom, (the Ancient, Equall, Happy, well-poyſed, and never enough Commended Conſtitution of the Government of this Kingdom. *page* 17.) hath made this Nation ſo many years both Famous and Happy, and to a great Degree of Envy. *page* 20.

Q. 7 *How comes it to paſſe that this Conſtitution is ſo Excellent.*

A. The Experience and Wiſdom of your Anceſtors hath ſo moulded this, out of a mixture of theſe, as to give to this Kingdom (as farre as Humane Prudence can provide) the Conveniences of all three, without the Inconvenience of any one *p.* 18

Obſerv. 1. Then thoſe that would place in the King, an Abſolute and Abitrary Power to do what he Liſt, are Deſtructive to the Nations Happineſſe, and Enemies to the Kingdom.

2. If this Mixture cauſe this happineſſe, then it is not the Greatneſſe of the Kings Power over his People, but the Reſtraint of that Power that hath made this Kingdom famous and Happy; for other Kings have Power as large, but not ſo much reſtrained; which Largeneſſe of their Power hath Raiſed thoſe Kings indeed, (but not their Kingdoms) to a great degree of Envy.

3. Hence we diſcern, that it is Poſſible for Kings to envy their Peoples Happineſſe, becauſe the largeneſſe of the Peoples Happineſſe depends much upon the Reſtraint of the Kings Exorbitant Power.

4. If this Mixture and well-Poised Constitution have raised this Kingdom to so Great a Degree of Envy, no marvell if Iesuiticall Councells be Active to overthrow this Happy Constitution.

Q. 8 *What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy?*

A. The Uniting of a Nation under one Head, to Resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home. *page* 18.

Obs. 1. What Pernicious Councellours are they then to a Monarch that advise him to bring in from abroad German Horse, or an Irish Army, or a Fleet of Danes to invade this Kingdom; or to imploy Dunkeirk Ships to seaze upon his Merchants, which is so formally contrary to the proper Good or End of Monarchy it self?

2. Or are they better or worse that Advise him to Authorize, or even permit any in his Name to Plunder, Rob, Spoil, Imprison any of his Subjects, whom they have found peaceably in their houses, or at work in the Fields, and have not disobeyed any Legall Command of his?

Q. 9 *What is the Ill of Absolute Monarchy? or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable?*

A. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy, is Tyranny. *page* 18.

Obs. 1. Therefore the more Absolute a Monarch is, the more prone to be a Tyrant.

2. Therfore also it is safer to Restrain the King of some Power to do us good, then to grant him too much opportunity to do us hurt; and the Danger is greater to the People in Enlarging the Kings Power, then in restraining it somewhat.

Q. 10 *What is the Good or Conveniency of Aristocracy?*

A. The good of Aristocracy is the Coniunction of Councells in the Ablest Persons of a State for publike Benefit. *page* 18

Obs. 1. Then surely it is for the *Publike Benefit* of the State, that this *Conjunction of Councells* in Parliament should be made use of more then once in thirteen or fourteen years; and the Law for a Triennial Parliament (if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly) was a most necessary Law, as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty dayes.

2. It was not then Intended in the *Constitution of this Govern-*

ment,

ment, that the King in the Greatest Matters of Importance for Publike Benefit, should only hear what they say, and then follow it or reject it Meerly at his owne *Pleasure*; for this may be as well done in an Absolute Monarchy.

3. Neither is it agreeable to the *Constitution* of this Kingdom, to withdraw the King from affording his Presence to his Great Councell of State, that so the private Counsels of Private men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the *Constitution of the Kingdom*, counts the Ablest to Iudge of Publike Benefit.

Q. 11 *What is the Ill of Aristocracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable?*

A. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division. *page.* 18.

Obs. What shall we say then to those Private Councellors that have abused the King, by perswading him first to withdraw himself from his Parliament, and then to call away the Members of both Houses, when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be Adjourned to another Place, much lesse Dissolved? Yet if all would have come away at call, had it not been Dissolved for want of Legall Numbers Remaining? And what Greater Faction or Division can there be, then such as Divide between King and Parliament, and between the House and their Members? Are not they most Pernicious Instruments, that make Monarchie it self, (whose end is to unite as was said before) thus far guilty of *Faction* and *Division*?

Q. 12 *What is the Good, or Convenience of Democracy?*

A. The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and Industry which Liberty begets *page* 18.

Obs. 1 Then the more Liberties are Encroached upon, the more the People will be rendred Cowardly and Poor, as may be plain enough seen by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Q. *Elizabeths* dayes, with what hath been of Late Dayes.

2. The King himself, when once his Subjects by having lost their Liberties shall lose withall their Courages, will prove the greatest Looser; for then his Kingdom will be an easie Prey to any Forrain Invader, or even to a home-bred Usurper, that could gather any

any ſudden Strength, and would Promiſe more Libertie.

Q. 13 *What is the Ill of Democracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable?*

A. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiouſneſſe. *page* 18.

Obſ. If theſe be the Evils for which the Peoples Liberty ought to be Reſtrained by the Mixture in this Government, then the Reſtraint of the Liberty ſhould be meaſured according to the Exigency of theſe Evils, and ſo much Liberty need onely be Reſtrained as is ſufficient for the Prevention of theſe *Evils*.

Q. 14 *What is the mixture of this Kingdom, which gives it the Conveniences of all the three forementioned kinds of Government, without the Inconveniences of any one.*

A. In this Kingdom the Lawes are Joyntly made by a King, by a houſe of Peeres, and by a houſe of Commons choſen by the people: All having free Votes, and particular priviledges. *page* 18.

Obſ. 1. Whereas there hath been great Queſtion made by many what is meant by the Power and Priviledges of Parliament, mentioned in the Proteſtation, which hath been ſo generally made thorowout the Kingdom? There is no Reaſon to doubt but thoſe things which the King grants afterward, to be the particular Priviledge of each Houſe, and of both, are their certain Priviledges according to Law, and the Conſtitution of the Kingdom; and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Proteſtation is moſt ſtrictly bound, without peradventure or ſhift.

2. That the Priviledges which the King challenges to Himſelf, are to be yeelded to, onely ſo far forth as they are conſiſtent with the Acknowledged Priviledges of the two Houſes; becauſe the Monarchy being Acknowledged to be a Regulated Monarchy, and the Government mixt of Ariſtocracy and Democracy, as well a Monarchy; it is the Priviledges of the two Houſes of Parliament that makes the mixture, and ſo they muſt Regulate and Interpret the Priviledges of the King, and not the Priviledges of the King Regulate or Interpret theirs, ſave onely to the maintaining

ſtill the Regall Dignitie, and the Succeſſion according to Laws.

Q. 15 *what Priviledges doth the King chalenge to himſelf?*

A. The Government according to theſe Lawes is truſted to the King: power of treaties of warre and peace, of making Peeres, of chooſing Officers, and Councellors for State Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Caſtles; giving Commiſſions for raiſing men to make Warre abroad, or to preuent or prouide againſt Innaſions and Inſurrections at home, Benefit of Confiſcations, power of pardoniug, and ſome other of like kind are placed in the King. *page* 18.

Obſ. 1. That all theſe are ordinarily in the King, Experience and Cuſtom Teaches, even thoſe that Know not the Law by reading; but by what hath been noted before, and follows after, it is to be underſtood only ſo, as not to prejudice the Priviledges of the Houſes of Parliament, ſpecially in caſes of Neceſſitie, (of which hereafter.) Alſo——

2. It is acknowledged here, that the Government, Truſted, is to be according to the Lawes, and ſo all theſe Things are not Abſolutely in the King; as for inſtance, *Pardons*, the Law denies Power of Pardoning wilfull Murther; And Benefit of ſome Confiſcations belongs to ſome Private Lords of Mannours.

3. If Government onely according to Law be truſted to the King then to Reſiſt Notorious Illegall Violences is not to Reſiſt the Kings Authority.

Q. 16 *For what end is this Authority truſted to the King, and placed in him?*

A. For our Subiects ſake theſe rights are veſted in us *p.* 17 The Prince may not make uſe of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of thoſe for whoſe good he hath it. *page.* 19.

Obſ. 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchiall Greatneſſe of the King (the End is ever more conſiderable then the Means) *Salus Populi* is *ſuprema Lex.*

2. Whoſoever counſels the King to any Thing againſt the good of his Subjects, is the Kings Enemy as well as the Commonwealths, by Attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his Authoritie.

Q. 17 *To what purpose especially are the priviledges of the house of Commons and the house of Peeres?*

A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it: and make use of the name of publike Necessity for the gain of his private Favourites and Followers &c. *page* 19.

Obs. 1. The Law then supposes, that such Cases may fall out, though it then Charge the Blame upon those *Favorites* and *Followers*, and not upon the King (as we shall see by and by.)

2. We need not wonder then why Private *Favorites* and *Followers* are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Priviledges, which are on purpose to hinder their gains: Of which also more anon.

3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems, to be *Trusted*, when they Declare, that the Power is made use of for the Hurt of the People; and the Name of *Publike Necessitie* made use of for the Gain of *Private Favorites* and *Followers*, and the like.

Q. 18 *What are the speciall priviledges of the House of Commons towards this?*

A. The House of Commons, an Excellent conserver of Liberty —— is solely Intrusted with the first propositions concerning the Leauies of Moneys which is the Sinnews as well of peace as of warre &c *page* 19.

Obs. 1. It seems then the *House of Commons* is presumed to be more carefull for the Subjects Liberties, then either the King, or the House of Peers.

2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive (as the Kings Declarations would Perswade) that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Libertie and Propriety of the Subject, and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them, and Protect them.

3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed, neither for Peace nor Warre, no not under Pretence of *Publike Necessity*, (as Ship-money and Monopolies were) without the House of Commons first propound and Grant it.

4. If

4. If the House of Commons be an *Excellent Conserver of Libertie*, it must Needs have some Power in some Cases to Levie Mony even without the Kings consent; or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Libertie at all. Of which likewise more anon.

Q. 19. *But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have actually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Priviledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty?*

A. with the Impeaching of those, who for their own Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King, haue violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knowes it) to protect; and to the protection of which they were bound to aduise him, at least not to serue him in the contrary. *page 19.*

Obs. 1. Then it is no Excuse to any that Violate the Laws, that they *serve the King* in it.

2. The Law counts all Commands from the King, which are any way contrary to the Law, *Surreptitiously-Gotten.*

3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law, when they constantly lay the Blame of all violations upon the Kings *Favorites* and *Followers*, and their getting Surreptitiously Commands from him, and not upon the King himself.

4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from Impeaching such as have violated the Law.

5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers and Favorites against the Commons Impeachment of them; because he Knows and Affirms, that he is bound to Protect the Laws, and that this is the Law, that the Commons are to Impeach such.

Qu. 20. *What is the speciall Priviledge of the House of Peers in the former Case of such Favorites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons? and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People.*

A. The Lords being trusted with a Judicatory power are an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people, to Assist each against any Encroachments of the other,

and by iuſt Iudgments to preſerue that Law which ought to be the Rule of euery one of the three, *page* 19.

Qu. 21. *But have the two Houſes Power to put their judgements into Execution, as well as to Impeach and Iudge?*

A. The power of puniſhment is already in your hands according to Law, *page* 20.

Obſ. 1. Then again it is no wonder that the Kings *Favorites* and *Followers* hate Parliaments, (who not onely Hinder their Gain, but have Power to puniſh them) when they have violated the Laws.

2. Then the Lords (and much more the two Houſes together) are ſupreme Judges of all matters in Difference between the King and the People, and have Power to Prevent all the Kings Encroachments upon the People, as well as the Peoples upon him.

3. Then the King is Bound not to Protect any whom the Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons, have Judged Delinquents; For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law; and that according to Law the Power of Puniſhing (even of his Favourites and Followers, 'fore ſpoken of) is in their hands, and they cannot puniſh them, ſo long as he Protects them.

4. Then the Law Allows them as the Supreme Judicatory (even that which muſt be a Skreen between the King and the People, and Aſſiſt the People againſt the Kings Encroachments, and puniſh the Kings *Favorites* and *Followers*, though countenanced by Surreptitiouſly-Gotten Commands from the King) a Power to bring ſuch as they have Judged, (or are to Judge) to Condign Puniſhment, which is granted to all Inferiour Judges in their Circuits and Iuriſdictions.

5. Then if thoſe Delinquents get the King to Protect them, or ſurreptiouſly get Commands of him, to Raiſe Arms to Shelter themſelves againſt the Iudgement of the two Houſes; the two Houſes have Power by the Law to Raiſe not onely the *Poſſe Comitatus* of thoſe Counties where ſuch Delinquents are, to apprehend them; but alſo the *Poſſe Regni*, the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be; or elſe the Power of Puniſhment is not in their hands according to Law; and it would be ſafer contemning and

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scorning and opposing the highest Judicatory, the Parliament, then any Inferiour Court, a Judge of Assize, or the like: and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before, would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned, if the Parliament had no Power to Raise Arms to suppresse them.

Qu. 22. *But if there be an Attempt or Danger, that the Kings Favorites and Followers go about to change this Regulated Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government, and so into a Tyrannie; is there Authoritie in the Houses sufficient, according to what was fore-mentioned to remedy this?*

A. Power Legally Placed in Both Houses is more then sufficient to Prevent and Restrain the power of Tyrannie P. 20.

Obs. 1. Then at least what ever Power is Necessary to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyrannie is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses; for else there is not Power sufficient, much lesse, more then sufficient.

2. Then it is Lawfull for the two Houses to Raise Arms to defend themselves in case an Army be Raised against them, for else they have not Power sufficient to restrain the Power of Tyrannie: There is no Greater Attempt of Tyrannie then to Raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament, and there is no way to Restrain this Tyrannie, but by Raising Arms in their own Defence: Lesse then this cannot be sufficient.

3. If a Legall Power be placed in them, not onely to Restrain, but *prevent the Power of Tyrannie*, then they are the Legall Iudges, when there is danger of Tyrannie; and they have Legall Power to Command their judgement to be obeyed, for Prevention as well as Restraint of *Tyrannie*.

4. Then it is Lawfull for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safetie, and they have Legall Power to command the People to this purpose; not onely when Arms are Actually Raised against them, but when they Discern, and accordingly Declare a Preparation made towards it: for if they let alone altogether the *Exercise* of their Power, till Arms are *Actually* Raised against them; they may in all likelihood finde it too *late*,

not onely to *Prevent*, but even to *Restrain the Power of Tyrannie*.

5. Then they have Legall Power in such Times of Danger, to put into safe hands, such Forts, Ports, Magazines, Ships, and Power of the *Militia*, as are Intended, or likely to be Intended, to Introduce a Tyranny; for else they cannot have Power sufficient to *Prevent* or *Restrain the Power of Tyrannie*.

6. Then they have Legall Power to Levie Moneys, Arms, Horse, Ammunitions, upon the Subjects, in such cases of *Danger*, even without or against the Kings Consent; for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him, to Protect them in their Delinquencies, and Attempts to Introduce Tyrannie, that ever he will consent to Levies of Moneys against those Favourites and Followers of his, or to the Raising Arms against them, specially he being still in their hands, and among them, and not with his Parliament; and without such Levies of Moneys, &c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to Prevent or Restraine sufficiently the Power of Tyrannie.

7 They that have made the *Protestation*, to maintain and defend the *Power and Priviledges of Parliament*, may see in all these Things (Acknowledged by the King, and clearly Following from his Acknowledgements) what is that *Power*, and what are *Priviledges of Parliament*, which they have so solemnly in the Presence of Almighty God Vowed, Promised and Protested to maintain, &c.

8. And finally, since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully Declared their *Intentions* in settling the *Militia*, securing *Hull* and the Magazine there, and the Navie at Sea, with the Ports and Forts, and afterward in Raising Arms under the Command of the *Earl of Essex*, and last of all, Levying Moneys by voluntary Contributions and Assessements; they have onely used that *Legall Power* which is in them for the Punishment of *Delinquents*, and for the *Prevention* and *Restraint* of the Power of Tyrannie, of all which they are the Legall Judges; and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein, and those doubly bound that have made the late *Protestation*.

That

That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applied do agree with the words of his Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions, I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular.

Page 17. We call God to witnesse, that as for our subiects sake these Rights are vested in Us, so for their sakes (as well as for our own) we are resolued not to quit them nor to subuert (though in a parliamentary way) the ancient, equall, happy, well-poysed, and neuer-enough-commended Constitution of the gouernment of this kingdom.

There being three kinds of gouernment amongst men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these hauing their particular conueniences and inconueniences.

page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to giue to this kingdom (as farre as humane prudence can prouide) the conueniences of all three, without the inconueniences of any one, as long as the Ballance hangs euen between the three Estates, and they run ioyntly on in their proper channell (begetting Verdure and Fertility in the meadows on both sides) and the ouer-flowing of either on either side, raise no Deluge or Inundation. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Diuision. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousnesse: The good of Monarchy is the Uniting a Nation under one Head, to Resist Inuasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home: The good of Aristocracy is the coniunction of Councell in the Ablest persons of a State for the publike benefit: The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and industry which Liberty begets.

In this kingdom the Laws are ioyntly made by a King, by a house of Peeres, and by a house of Commons chosen by the people, all hauing free Votes and particular priuiledges. The gouernment according to these Laws is trusted to the King, power of Treaties of war & peace, of making Peeres, of chusing Officers & Counsellours for State, Iudges for Law, Cōmanders for Forts & Castles giving Cōmissions for raising men to make war abroad, or to preuent & prouide against Inuasions or Insurrections at home, benefit of Confis-

cations

cations, power of pardoning, & some more of the like kinde are pla
ced in the King.— Again, *Page* 19. that the Prince may not mak
use of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whos
good he hath it, and make use of the name of publike Necessity for th
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Pag. 10. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Ho
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which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous & H
py to a great degree of enuy; since to the power of punishing (wh
is already in your hands according to Law) if —— since the
croaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is
happy in the effects both to them & all the rest.— *Pag.* 22. Our
swer is, Nolumus Leges Angliæ mutari. But this we pr
that we will be as carefull of preserving the Lawes in wha
supposed to concern wholly our Subiects, as in what most c
cerns Our self: For indeed we professe to beleeue that the pre
uation of euery Law concerns Us, those of Obedience being
secure, when those of protection are Violated.

FINIS.